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1 Introduction
Recently, a large number of papers have established the fact that locally
indeterminate equilibria and sunspots fluctuations easily arise within two-
sector infinite-horizon growth models with sector specific external effects in
production and linear preferences.1 For instance, considering Cobb-Douglas
technologies, Benhabib and Nishimura [2] prove within a continuous-time
model that the existence of local indeterminacy is obtained if and only if
there is a reversal of factor intensities between the private and social levels.
The consumption goods has indeed to be capital intensive from the private
perspective but labor intensive from the social perspective.
When CES technologies are introduced, a much larger set of configura-
tions is compatible with local indeterminacy. In particular, Leontief or linear
technologies for the consumption good sector may be considered. Therefore,
we will consider CES technologies in a continous-time model and provide a
complete analysis of the local determinacy properties of equilibria. We will
show that, even with asymmetric factor substitutability properties, local
indeterminacy is still based on a reversal of factor intensities between the
private and social levels, what we call quasi factor intensity. We will also
show that local indeterminacy is compatible with a Leontief technology in
the consumption good sector, and that this result is preserved if the elasticity
of capital-labor substitution in that sector is not too large.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the basic model
with the production structure, the intertemporal equilibrium and the steady
state. In Section 3 we provide all the results on the existence of local in-
determinacy depending on different configurations for the CES coefficients
at the private and social levels. Section 4 finally contains some concluding
comments. All the proofs are gathered in a final Appendix.
1See Benhabib and Farmer [1].
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2 The model
2.1 The production structure
We consider an economy producing a pure consumption good y0 and a pure
capital good y1. Each good is assumed to be produced by capital x0j and
labor x1j , j = 0, 1, through a CES technology which contains sector spe-
cific externalities. The representative firm in each industry indeed faces the
following function:
yj =
(
β0jx
−ρj
0j + β1jx
−ρj
1j + ej(X0j , X1j)
)−1/ρj
, j = 0, 1 (1)
with βij > 0, ρj > −1 and σj = 1/(1+ρj) ≥ 0 the elasticity of capital-labor
substitution. The positive externalities are equal to
ej(X0j , X1j) = b0jX
−ρj
0j + b1jX
−ρj
1j
with bij ≥ 0 and Xij denoting the average use of input i in sector j. We
assume that these economy-wide averages are taken as given by each indi-
vidual firm. At the equilibrium, since all firms of sector j are identical, we
have Xij = xij and we may define the social production functions as follows
yj =
(
βˆ0jx
−ρj
0j + βˆ1jx
−ρj
1j
)−1/ρj
(2)
with βˆij = βij + bij . The returns to scale are therefore constant at the
social level, and decreasing at the private level. We assume that in each
sector j = 0, 1, βˆ0j + βˆ1j = 1 so that the production functions collapse to
Cobb-Douglas in the particular case ρj = 0. Labor is normalized to one, i.e.
x00 + x01 = 1, and the total stock of capital is given by x1 = x10 + x11.
Choosing the consumption good as the numeraire, i.e. p0 = 1, a firm in
each industry maximizes its profit given the output price p1, the rental rate
of capital w1 and the wage rate w0. Its profit is:
pij = pjyj − w0x0j − w1x1j
The first order conditions subject to the private technologies (1) are
pjβij (yj/xij)
1+ρj = wi, i, j = 0, 1 (3)
From (3) we have
xij/yj = (pjβij/wi)
1
1+ρj ≡ aij(wi, pj), i, j = 0, 1 (4)
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We call aij the input coefficients from the private viewpoint. If the agents
take account of externalities as endogenous variables in profit maximization,
the first order conditions subject to the social technologies (2) are
pj βˆij (yj/xij)
1+ρj = wi, i, j = 0, 1
and the input coefficients become
a¯ij(wi, pj) =
(
pj βˆij/wi
)1/(1+ρj)
, i, j = 0, 1 (5)
We call a¯ij the input coefficients from the social viewpoint. We also define
aˆij(wi, pj) ≡ (βˆij/βij)aij(wi, pj) (6)
as the quasi input coefficients from the social viewpoint, and it is easy to
derive that
aˆij(wi, pj) = a¯ij(wi, pj)
(
βˆij/βij
)ρj/(1+ρj)
Notice that aˆij = a¯ij if there is no externality coming from input i in sector
j, i.e. bij = 0, or if the production function is Cobb-Douglas, i.e. ρj = 0.
As we will show below, the factor-price frontier, which gives a relationship
between input prices and output prices, is not expressed with the input
coefficients from the social viewpoint but with quasi-input coefficients from
the social viewpoint.
Based on these input coefficients straightforward computations allow to
establish various Lemmas. We first show that the factor-price frontier is
determined by the quasi input coefficients from the social viewpoint.
Lemma 1. Denote p = (1, p1)′, w = (w0, w1)′ and Aˆ(w, p) = [aˆij(wi, pj)].
Then p = Aˆ′(w, p)w.
The factor market clearing equation depends on the input coefficients from
the private perspective.
Lemma 2. Denote x = (1, x1)′, y = (y0, y1)′ and A(w, p) = [aij(wi, pj)].
Then A(w, p)y = x.
Note that the rental rate is a function of the output price only, w1 =
w1(p1), while outputs are functions of the capital stock and the output price,
yj = yj(x1, p1), j = 0, 1.
We now examine some comparative statics. The factor-price frontier
satisfies the Stolper-Samuelson theorem:
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Lemma 3. dw1/dp1 =
aˆ00
aˆ11aˆ00 − aˆ10aˆ01 .
The factor market clearing equation finally satisfies the Rybczynski theorem:
Lemma 4. dy1/dx1 =
a00
a11a00 − a10a01 .
Without external effects, i.e. bij = 0, we have Aˆ(w, p) = A(w, p). The
Rybczynski and Stolper-Samuelson theorems are equivalent since [∂y/∂x] =
[∂w/∂p]. However, in presence of externalities, the Rybczynski effects de-
pend on the input coefficients from the private perspective while the Stolper-
Samuelson effects depend on the quasi input coefficients from the social per-
spective. The duality between these two effects is thus destroyed. Local
indeterminacy of equilibria will be a consequence of this property.
2.2 Intertemporal equilibrium and steady state
A representative agent optimizes a linear additively separable utility func-
tion with discount rate δ ≥ 0. This problem can be described as:
max
{xij(t)}
∫ +∞
0
(
β00x00(t)−ρ0 + β10x10(t)−ρ0 + e0(X00(t), X10(t))
)− 1
ρ0 e−δtdt
s.t. y1(t) =
(
β01x01(t)−ρ1 + β11x11(t)−ρ1 + e1(X01(t), X11(t))
)− 1
ρ1
x˙1(t) = y1(t)− gx1(t)
1 = x00(t) + x01(t)
x1(t) = x10(t) + x11(t)
x1(0) and {ej(X0j(t), X1j(t))}t≥0, j = 0, 1, given
where g > 0 is the depreciation rate of the capital stock. We can write the
modified Hamiltonian in current value as:
H =
(
β00x00(t)−ρ0 + β10x10(t)−ρ0 + e0(X00(t), X10(t))
)− 1
ρ0
+ w0(t) (1− x00(t)− x01(t)) + w1(t) (x1(t)− x10(t)− x11(t))
+ p1(t)
((
β01x01(t)−ρ1 + β11x11(t)−ρ1 + e1(X01(t), X11(t))
)− 1
ρ1 − gx1(t)
)
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The static first order conditions are given by equations (3). The necessary
conditions which describe the solution to the optimization problem are given
by the following equations of motion:
x˙1(t) = y1(x1(t), p1(t))− gx1(t)
p˙1(t) = (δ + g)p1(t)− w1(p1(t))
(7)
Any solution {x1(t), p1(t)}t≥0 that also satisfies the transversality condition
lim
t→+∞ e
−δtp1(t)x1(t) = 0
is called an equilibrium path.
A steady state is defined by a pair (x∗1, p∗1) solution of
y1(x1, p1) = gx1
w1(p1) = (δ + g)p1
(8)
We introduce the following restriction on parameters’ values which will en-
sure the existence of an unique non trivial steady state:
Assumption 1. β11 > δ + g and ρ1 ∈ (ρˆ1,+∞) with
ρˆ1 ≡ lnβˆ11
ln
“
β11
δ+g
”
−lnβˆ11
∈ (−1, 0) (9)
Considering the fact that, within continuous-time models, the discount rate δ
and the capital depreciation rate g are quite small, the restriction β11 > δ+g
does not appear to be too demanding. Assumption 1 precisely guarantees
positiveness and interiority of all the steady state values for input demand
functions xij . Moreover it allows to prove the following result:
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1, there exists a unique steady state
(x∗1, p∗1) > 0 such that
x∗1 =
“
β10β01
β00β11
” 1
1+ρ0
(„
β11
δ+g
« ρ1
1+ρ1 −βˆ11
βˆ01
) 1+ρ1
ρ1(1+ρ0)
1−
“
β11
δ+g
” 1
1+ρ1 g
266641−“β10β01β00β11 ” 11+ρ0
(„
β11
δ+g
« ρ1
1+ρ1 −βˆ11
βˆ01
) ρ1−ρ0
ρ1(1+ρ0)
37775
p∗1 =
β10
δ+g
βˆ00 (β10β01β00β11) ρ01+ρ0
(“
β11
δ+g
” ρ1
1+ρ1 −βˆ11
βˆ01
) ρ0(1+ρ1)
ρ1(1+ρ0)
+ βˆ10

− 1+ρ0
ρ0
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3 Main results
We start by linearizing the dynamical system (7) around (x∗1, p∗1):
J =
 ∂y1∂x1 (x∗1, p∗1)− g ∂y1∂p1 (x∗1, p∗1)
0 −∂w1∂p1 (p∗1) + δ + g

Any solution from (7) that converges to the steady state (x∗1, p∗1) satisfies
the transversality condition and is an equilibrium. Therefore, given x1(0), if
there is more than one initial price p1(0) in the stable manifold of (x∗1, p∗1),
the equilibrium path from x1(0) will not be unique. In particular, if J has
two roots with negative real parts, there will be a continuum of converging
paths and thus a continuum of equilibria.
Definition 1. If the locally stable manifold of the steady state (x∗1, p∗1) is
two-dimensional, then (x∗1, p∗1) is said to be locally indeterminate.
The roots of J are given by the diagonal terms. We know from Lemmas
3 and 4 that ∂y1/∂x1 corresponds to the factor intensity difference from the
private viewpoint and ∂w1/∂p1 corresponds to the quasi factor intensity dif-
ference from the social viewpoint. Using the definitions of input coefficients
given in Section 2, we may indeed interpret the elements of ∂y1/∂x1 and
∂w1/∂p1 as follows:
Definition 2. The consumption good is said to be:
i) capital intensive at the private level if and only if a11a00−a10a01 < 0,
ii) quasi capital intensive at the social level if and only if aˆ11aˆ00 −
aˆ10aˆ01 < 0,
iii) capital intensive at the social level if and only if a¯11a¯00− a¯10a¯01 < 0.
We may thus relate the input coefficients to the CES parameters:
Proposition 2. Let Assumption 1 hold. At the steady state:
i) the consumption good is capital (labor) intensive from the private per-
spective if and only if
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b ≡ 1−
(
β10β01
β00β11
) 1
1+ρ0
(“
β11
δ+g
” ρ1
1+ρ1 −βˆ11
βˆ01
) ρ1−ρ0
ρ1(1+ρ0)
< (>)0
ii) the consumption good is quasi capital (labor) intensive from the social
perspective if and only if
bˆ ≡ 1− βˆ10βˆ01
βˆ00βˆ11
(
β00β11
β10β01
) ρ0
1+ρ0
(“
β11
δ+g
” ρ1
1+ρ1 −βˆ11
βˆ01
) ρ1−ρ0
ρ1(1+ρ0)
< (>)0
iii) the consumption good is capital (labor) intensive from the social per-
spective if and only if
b¯ ≡ 1−
(
βˆ10βˆ01
βˆ00βˆ11
) 1
1+ρ0
(„
βˆ11
δ+g
« ρ1
1+ρ1 −βˆ11
βˆ01
) ρ1−ρ0
ρ1(1+ρ0)
< (>)0
The following Proposition establishes that local indeterminacy requires
a capital intensity reversal from the private input coefficients to the quasi
input coefficients.
Proposition 3. Let Assumption 1 hold. The steady state is locally inde-
terminate if and only if the consumption good is capital intensive from the
private perspective, but quasi labor intensive from the social perspective.
To get indeterminacy in a framework with constant returns to scale at
the social level, we need a mechanism that nullify the duality between the
Rybczynski and Stolper-Samuelson effects. As shown in Section 2.1, the Ry-
bczynski effect is given by the input coefficients from the private perspective
while the Stolper-Samuelson effect is given by the quasi input coefficients
from the social perspective. In the presence of external effects, the duality
between these coefficients is broken and local indeterminacy may appear.
This mechanism is very similar to the one exhibited in the contribution
of Benhabib and Nishimura [2]. However in the current paper, it follows
that depending on the value of the elasticities of capital-labor substitution,
the capital intensity reversal from the private input coefficients to the quasi
input coefficients does not necessarily requires a capital intensity reversal
from the private to the social level.
Propositions 2 and 3 show that the stability properties of the steady state
depend, among all the parameters, on whether the ratios β10β01/β11β00 and
7
βˆ10βˆ01/βˆ11βˆ00 are lower or greater than 1. Around the steady state, it can be
easily shown that if the elasticities of capital-labor substitution are identical
across sectors, the consumption good is capital intensive at the private level
if and only if β10β01/β11β00 > 1 while it is capital intensive at the social
level if and only if βˆ10βˆ01/βˆ11βˆ00 > 1. With asymmetric elasticities, as it
is shown in Proposition 2, the capital intensity differences between sectors
also depend on the parameters ρ0 and ρ1.
Notice also from Proposition 2 that the capital intensity differences at
the private and quasi social level are linked as follows:
bˆ = 1−
βˆ10βˆ01
βˆ11βˆ00
β10β01
β11β00
(1− b)
We know from Proposition 3 that local indeterminacy requires the consump-
tion good to be capital intensive at the private level, i.e. b < 0, but quasi
labor intensive at the social level, i.e. bˆ > 0. It follows from the above
expression that when b < 0, a necessary condition for bˆ to be positive is
given by the following Assumption:
Assumption 2. βˆ10βˆ01
βˆ11βˆ00
< β10β01β11β00
Let us first consider the configuration β10β01/β11β00 < 1 which is known
in the case with symmetric elasticities of capital-labor substitution to imply
local determinacy of the steady state.2 The following Proposition shows
on the contrary that as soon as the elasticities are sufficiently asymmetric,
there is room for local indeterminacy.
Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 1-2, let
1 > β10β01β11β00 and 1 >
βˆ10βˆ01
βˆ11βˆ00
> βˆ01β11
δ+g
−βˆ11 (10)
Then there are ρ
0
∈ (−1, 0), ρ¯0 > 0 such that the following results hold:
i) for any given ρ0 ∈ (ρ0, ρ¯0), there exist ρ1 > max{0, ρ0} and ρ¯1 > ρ1
such that the steady state is locally indeterminate when ρ1 ∈ (ρ1, ρ¯1);
ii) for any given ρ0 > ρ¯0, there exists ρ1 > ρ0 such that the steady state
is locally indeterminate when ρ1 > ρ1.
2See Benhabib and Nishimura [2] for Cobb-Douglas economies and Nishimura and
Venditti [3] for CES economies with symmetric elasticities of capital-labor substitution.
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Before giving interpretations of our results, we need to justify the part of
condition (10) which concerns the CES coefficients at the social level: this
inequality ensures the existence of the bounds ρ¯0 and ρ0, and the possible
occurrence of local indeterminacy when both elasticities of capital labor
substitution are close to zero.
All the various conditions for the existence of indeterminacy in Pro-
position 4 are based on the restriction ρ1 > ρ0 which implies a lower
elasticity of capital-labor substitution in the investment good sector than
in the consumption good sector. Since under Assumption 1 the elasticity of
capital-labor substitution in the investment good sector is necessarily finite,
it clearly appears that the same condition has to be considered for the invest-
ment good sector. In cases i), if the elasticity of capital-labor substitution in
the consumption good sector is large enough, the extreme configuration of a
Leontief technology in the investment good sector is also ruled out. On the
contrary, if the factor substitutability of the consumption good sector is low
enough, local indeterminacy becomes compatible with a Leontief technology
in the investment good sector.
Let us now consider the configuration with β10β01/β11β00 > 1 and
βˆ10βˆ01/βˆ11βˆ00 < 1 which is known to imply the existence of local indeterm-
inacy in the case with Cobb-Douglas technologies in both sectors.3 Notice
that Assumption 2 is then necessarily satisfied.
Proposition 5. Under Assumption 1, let
β10β01
β11β00
> 1 and 1 > βˆ10βˆ01
βˆ11βˆ00
> βˆ01β11
δ+g
−βˆ11 (11)
Then there are ρ
0
∈ (−1, 0) and ρ¯0 > 0 such that the following results hold:
i) for any given ρ0 ∈ (ρ0, ρ¯0), there exist ρ1 ∈ (ρˆ1, 0) and ρ¯1 > 0 such
that the steady state is locally indeterminate when ρ1 ∈ (ρ1, ρ¯1);
ii) for any given ρ0 > ρ¯0, there exists ρ1 ∈ (0, ρ0) such that the steady
state is locally indeterminate when ρ1 > ρ1.
Proposition 5 covers the formulation with symmetric elasticities of capital-
labor substitution across sectors previously analyzed in Benhabib and
3See Benhabib and Nishimura [2].
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Nishimura [2] with Cobb-Douglas technologies and Nishimura and Venditti
[3] with CES technologies having symmetric elasticities of capital-labor sub-
stitution. The part of condition (11) which concerns the CES coefficients at
the social level is introduced to ensure the possibility of local indeterminacy
when the consumption good technology is Cobb-Douglas while the invest-
ment good technology is Leontief (see case ii)). This explains why such
a condition does not occur under the assumption of symmetric elasticities.
However, since the plausible values of δ and g are close to zero, this condition
does not imply a strong restriction on the CES coefficients.
Contrary to the previous Proposition, the existence of local indetermin-
acy does not require the elasticity of capital-labor substitution in the con-
sumption good sector to be larger than the one in the investment good sec-
tor. The extreme configuration of an infinite factor substitutability in the
consumption good sector is again ruled out. Moreover, as shown in case ii),
the occurrence of local indeterminacy with factors complementarity in the
investment good sector is not compatible with a Cobb-Douglas technology
in the consumption good sector and requires an elasticity of capital-labor
substitution significantly lower than 1.
Let us finally consider the configuration with βˆ10βˆ01/βˆ11βˆ00 > 1 which
is known in the case with symmetric elasticities of capital-labor substitution
to be compatible with the existence of local indeterminacy only when the
common elasticity is lower than one, or ρ0 = ρ1 = ρ > 0.4 In the next
Proposition, we show that in the asymmetric case, ρ0 has to be positive but
under Assumption 1, ρ1 can be negative, equal to 1 or positive.
Proposition 6. Under Assumptions 1-2, let
β10β01
β11β00
> 1 and βˆ10βˆ01
βˆ11βˆ00
> 1 (12)
Then there are ρ
0
> 0 and ρ¯0 > ρ0 such that the following results hold:
i) for any given ρ0 ∈ (ρ0, ρ¯0), there exist ρ1 ∈ (ρˆ1, ρ0) and ρ¯1 > 0 such
that the steady state is locally indeterminate when ρ1 ∈ (ρ1, ρ¯1);
4See Nishimura and Venditti [3].
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ii) for any given ρ0 > ρ¯0, there exists ρ1 > 0 such that the steady state
is locally indeterminate when ρ1 > ρ1.
Proposition 6 confirms only part of the conclusions obtained by Nishimura
and Venditti [3] under symmetric elasticities of capital-labor substitution
across sectors: local indeterminacy requires some elasticity lower than one
but only in the consumption good sector. Indeed, the existence of multiple
equilibria does not rely on particular restrictions for the factor substitutab-
ility in the investment good sector. In particular, some elasticities greater
than 1 are compatible with local indeterminacy in case i). However, as in
the previous Propositions, a Leontief technology for the investment good
can be reached only if the elasticity in the consumption good sector is low
enough.
4 Concluding comments
Within the framework of CES technologies, we precisely show how much the
elasticities of capital-labor substitution can differ across the industries while
leading to local indeterminacy of equilibria. For instance, given a value for
the elasticity of substitution in the consumption good sector, the elasticity
of substitution in the investment good sector can be arbitrarily large.
5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Substituting (4) into the social production functions (2) gives
yj =
(
βˆ0jy
−ρj
j
(
pjβ0j
w0
) −ρj
1+ρj + βˆ1jy
−ρj
j
(
pjβ1j
w1
) −ρj
1+ρj
)−1/ρj
It follows that
p
ρj
1+ρj
j =
(
βˆ0j
β0j
(
β0j
w0
) 1
1+ρj w0 +
βˆ1j
β1j
(
β1j
w1
) 1
1+ρj w1
)−1/ρj
Multiplying both sides by p1/(1+ρj)j then gives
11
pj = aˆ0jw0 + aˆ1jw1
The result follows considering that p0 = 1.
5.2 Proof of Lemma 2
By definition xij = aijyj and thus
xi = ai0y0 + ai1y1
The result follows considering that x0 = 1.
5.3 Proof of Lemma 3
The result immediately follows from the fact that the function Aˆ(w, p) is
homogeneous of degree zero in w and p.
5.4 Proof of Lemma 4
The result follows from a direct differenciation of xi = ai0y0 + ai1y1 under
the assumption that prices are constant.
5.5 Proof of Proposition 1
From equation (3) considered at the steady state with y1 = gx1 and w1 =
(δ + g)p1, we get
x11 =
(
β11
δ+g
) 1
1+ρ1 gx1
Using now the social production function (2) for the investment good we
derive
x01 =
(“
β11
δ+g
” ρ1
1+ρ1 −βˆ11
βˆ01
)− 1
ρ1 (
β11
δ+g
) 1
1+ρ1 gx1
and thus
x01
x11
=
(“
β11
δ+g
” ρ1
1+ρ1 −βˆ11
βˆ01
)− 1
ρ1
(13)
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Finally we easily obtain from (3):
β10β01
β00β11
=
(
x01
x11
)1+ρ1 (x10
x00
)1+ρ0
⇔ x10x00 =
(
β10β01
β00β11
) 1
1+ρ0
(“
β11
δ+g
” ρ1
1+ρ1 −βˆ11
βˆ01
) 1+ρ1
ρ1(1+ρ0)
(14)
Considering (13), (14) and the fact that x00 + x01 = 1, x1 = x10 + x11, we
get the final expression of x∗1. Equation (3) for i = 1 and j = 0 gives
w1 = β10
(
βˆ11
(
x10
x00
)ρ0
+ βˆ10
)− 1+ρ0
ρ0
The final expression of p∗1 is then derived from (14) and the fact that w1 =
(δ + g)p1.
5.6 Proof of Proposition 2
i) From (4) we derive
a11a00 − a10a01 = a00a01
(
a11
a01
− a10a00
)
= a00a01 x11x01
(
1− x10x01x00x11
)
and the result follows after substitution of (13) and (14) into the previous
expression.
ii) From (6) we derive
aˆ11aˆ00 − aˆ10aˆ01 = aˆ00aˆ01
(
βˆ11
βˆ01
β01
β11
a11
a01
− βˆ10
βˆ00
β00
β10
a10
a00
)
= a00a01 βˆ11βˆ01
β01
β11
x11
x01
(
1− βˆ10βˆ01
βˆ00βˆ11
β00β11
β10β01
x10x01
x00x11
)
and the result follows after substitution of (13) and (14) into the previous
expression.
iii) The result is derived as in i) but considering instead the input coefficients
at the social level (5).
5.7 Proof of Proposition 3
From Lemma 2, x1 = a10y0+a11y1. Moreover, at the steady state, y1 = gx1,
and it follows
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a10y0 + ga11x1 = x1 ⇔ a10y0 = [1− ga11]x1 > 0
Therefore
∂y1
∂x1
− g = a00a11a00−a10a01 − g =
a00[1−ga11]+a10a01g
a11a00−a10a01 < 0
if and only if a11a00 − a10a01 < 0. From Lemma 1, p1 = aˆ01w0 + aˆ11w1.
Moreover, at the steady state, (δ + g)p1 = w1, and it follows
(δ+ g)aˆ01w0+(δ+ g)aˆ11w1 = w1 ⇔ (δ+ g)aˆ01w0 = [1− (δ+ g)aˆ11]w1 > 0
Therefore
δ + g − ∂w1∂p1 = δ + g − aˆ00aˆ11aˆ00−aˆ10aˆ01
= − [1−(δ+g)aˆ11]aˆ00+(δ+g)aˆ10aˆ01aˆ11aˆ00−aˆ10aˆ01 < 0
if and only if aˆ11aˆ00 − aˆ10aˆ01 > 0.
5.8 Proof of Proposition 4
Proposition 3 shows that local indeterminacy occurs if and only if b < 0
and bˆ > 0. Under Assumption 1, β11 > δ + g and ρ1 ∈ (ρˆ1,+∞), while
ρ0 > −1 without particular restriction. We will then study the sign of b and
bˆ for different values of ρ0 and ρ1 over these intervals. Our strategy consists
in considering a fixed value for ρ0 and varying ρ1 in order to find intervals
of values in which local indeterminacy occurs. To simplify the analysis, we
have to impose some restrictions on the parameters ρ0 and ρ1 such that the
following function
g(ρ1) =
(“
β11
δ+g
” ρ1
1+ρ1 −βˆ11
βˆ01
) ρ1−ρ0
ρ1(1+ρ0)
(15)
is monotone increasing.
Lemma 5. Under Assumption 1, there is a ρ˜0 ∈ (−1, 0) such that for
any given ρ0 > ρ˜0 there exists ρ˜1 ∈ [ρˆ1, 0) such that g(ρ1) is a monotone
increasing function for all ρ1 > ρ˜1.
Proof : Notice first that
∂
∂ρ1
(
ρ1
1+ρ1
)
= 1
(1+ρ1)2
> 0, ∂∂ρ1
(
ρ1−ρ0
ρ1(1+ρ0)
)
= ρ0
ρ21(1+ρ0)
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It follows that for any given ρ0 ≥ 0, g(ρ1) is a monotone increasing function
when ρ1 ≥ 0. Consider now the case ρ0 ∈ (−1, 0). We can write g(ρ1) as
follows:
g(ρ1) = exp
{
ρ1−ρ0
ρ1(1+ρ0)
ln
(
exp
h
ρ1
1+ρ1
ln
“
β11
δ+g
”i
−βˆ11
βˆ01
)}
≡ exp{f(ρ1)}
If f(ρ1) is monotone increasing, so in g(ρ1). We easily compute
f ′(ρ1) =
ρ0(1+ρ1)2
[“
β11
δ+g
” ρ1
1+ρ1 −βˆ11
]
ln
(„
β11
δ+g
« ρ1
1+ρ1 −βˆ11
βˆ01
)
+ρ1(ρ1−ρ0)
“
β11
δ+g
” ρ1
1+ρ1 ln
“
β11
δ+g
”
ρ21(1+ρ1)
2(1+ρ0)
[“
β11
δ+g
” ρ1
1+ρ1 −βˆ11
]
We have now to compute the sign of limρ1→0 f ′(ρ1). A Taylor expansion of
order two allows to show that limρ1→0 f ′(ρ1) > 0 for any ρ0 > ρ˜0 with
ρ˜0 = −
[
1 + ln
(
β11
δ+g
)
βˆ11
2βˆ01
]−1 ∈ (−1, ρˆ1)
Notice finally that limρ1→ρˆ1 f ′(ρ1) = −∞ and limρ1→ρˆ1 f(ρ1) = +∞ if ρ0 <
ρˆ1, while limρ1→ρˆ1 f ′(ρ1) = +∞ and limρ1→ρˆ1 f(ρ1) = −∞ if ρ0 > ρˆ1.
We then conclude from all this that for any given ρ0 > ρ˜0, there exists
ρ˜1 ∈ [ρˆ1, 0) such that g(ρ1) is a monotone increasing function for all ρ1 > ρ˜1.
It clearly appears from Proposition 2 that under the conditions of Lemma
5, b and bˆ are monotone decreasing function of ρ1.
We may now prove Proposition 4: In the first part of the proof we
consider positive values of ρ1 only. Notice that L’Hoˆpital’s rule gives:
lim
ρ1→0
g(ρ1) =
(
β11
δ+g
) −ρ0
(1+ρ0)βˆ01 (16)
Consider the capital intensity difference at the private level b. The previous
result implies
lim
ρ1→0
b = 1−
(
β10β01
β00β11
) 1
1+ρ0
(
δ+g
β11
) ρ0
(1+ρ0)βˆ01 (17)
Notice that the right-hand-side of (17) is a monotone function of ρ0. Under
Assumption 2 and β10β01/β11β00 < 1, we derive limρ1→0 b|ρ0≥0 > 0. It
follows that there exists ρ10 ∈ [−1, 0) such that limρ1→0 b > 0 for any ρ0 > ρ10.
Similarly, we get
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lim
ρ1→+∞
b = 1−
(
β10β01
β00β11
) 1
1+ρ0
(
β11
δ+g
−βˆ11
βˆ01
) 1
1+ρ0 (18)
Notice again that the right-hand-side of (18) is a monotone function of ρ0.
If the following condition holds
β10β01
β00β11
β11
δ+g
−βˆ11
βˆ01
> 1 (19)
then limρ1→+∞ b|ρ0→+∞ = 0− and limρ1→+∞ b|ρ0≤0 < 0. It follows that
under (19), limρ1→+∞ b < 0 for any ρ0 > −1. Notice finally that if ρ0 = ρ1
we have b > 0. Considering Lemma 5 under (19), we then conclude that
for any given ρ0 > ρ10, there exists ρ
1
1 > max{0, ρ0} such that b < 0 for all
ρ1 > ρ
1
1.
Consider now the quasi capital intensity difference at the social level bˆ.
Equation (16) implies
lim
ρ1→0
bˆ = 1−
βˆ10βˆ01
βˆ11βˆ00
β10β01
β11β00
(
β10β01
β00β11
) 1
1+ρ0
(
δ+g
β11
) ρ0
(1+ρ0)βˆ01 (20)
Notice that the right-hand-side of (20) is a monotone function of ρ0. Under
Assumption 2 and βˆ10βˆ01/βˆ11βˆ00 < 1, we derive limρ1→0 bˆ|ρ0≥0 > 0 so that
there exists ρ20 ∈ [−1, 0) such that limρ1→0 bˆ > 0 for any ρ0 > ρ20. Since
bˆ > b, we get when ρ0 = ρ10, b|ρ1=0 = 0 while bˆ|ρ1=0 > 0 so that ρ20 < ρ10.
Similarly, we have
lim
ρ1→+∞
bˆ = 1−
βˆ10βˆ01
βˆ11βˆ00
β10β01
β11β00
(
β10β01
β00β11
) 1
1+ρ0
(
β11
δ+g
−βˆ11
βˆ01
) 1
1+ρ0 (21)
Notice again that the right-hand-side of (21) is a monotone function of ρ0.
If the following condition holds
βˆ10βˆ01
βˆ11βˆ00
β11
δ+g
−βˆ11
βˆ01
> 1 (22)
we get with limρ1→+∞ bˆ|ρ0=0 < 0 and limρ1→+∞ bˆ|ρ0→+∞ > 0. Therefore,
under (22), there exists ρ30 > 0 such that limρ1→+∞ bˆ > 0 for any ρ0 > ρ30.
Considering Lemma 5 under (22), we then conclude the following results:
- for any given ρ0 ∈ (ρ20, ρ30), there exists ρ21 > 0 such that bˆ > 0 for all
ρ1 ∈ [0, ρ21). Notice that since bˆ > b, ρ21 > ρ11;
- for any given ρ0 > ρ30, bˆ > 0 for all ρ1 > ρ0.
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Notice that under Assumption 2, (22) implies (19). Therefore, under
(22), we conclude that local indeterminacy occurs in the following cases:
i) for any given ρ0 ∈ (max{ρ10, ρ20}, ρ30) and ρ1 ∈ (ρ1, ρ¯1) with ρ1 = ρ11 >
max{0, ρ0} and ρ¯1 = ρ21 > ρ1;
ii) for any given ρ0 > ρ30 and ρ1 > ρ1 with ρ1 = ρ
2
1 > ρ0.
5.9 Proof of Proposition 5
We use the same kind of arguments as in Proposition 4. Consider first
the capital intensity difference at the private level b. Under Assumption 2
and β10β01/β11β00 > 1, we derive from (17) that limρ1→0 b|ρ0≤0 < 0 while
limρ1→0 b|ρ→+∞ > 0. Therefore, there exists ρ10 > 0 such that limρ1→0 b < 0
for any ρ0 ∈ (−1, ρ10). Similarly, we derive from (18) that limρ1→+∞ b < 0
for any ρ0 > −1. Notice also that
b|ρ1=ρ0 = 1−
(
β10β01
β00β11
) 1
1+ρ0 < 0 (23)
Considering Lemma 5, we then conclude the following results:
a) for any given ρ0 ∈ (−1, ρ10), b < 0 for all ρ1 ≥ 0;
b) for any given ρ0 > ρ10, there exists ρ
1
1 ∈ (0, ρ0) such that b < 0 for all
ρ1 > ρ
1
1.
Consider now the quasi capital intensity difference at the social level
bˆ. Under Assumption 2 and βˆ10βˆ01/βˆ11βˆ00 < 1, we derive from (20) that
limρ1→0 bˆ|ρ0≥0 > 0 while limρ1→0 bˆ|ρ0→−1 < 0. Therefore, there exists ρ20 ∈
(−1, 0) such that limρ1→0 bˆ > 0 for any ρ0 > ρ20. Similarly, we derive from
(21) that limρ1→+∞ bˆ|ρ0=0 < 0 if (22) holds, while limρ1→+∞ bˆ|ρ0→+∞ > 0.
Therefore, under (22), there exists ρ30 > 0 such that limρ1→+∞ bˆ > 0 for any
ρ0 > ρ
3
0. Notice also that
bˆ|ρ1=ρ0 = 1− βˆ10βˆ01βˆ11βˆ00
(
β00β11
β10β01
) ρ0
1+ρ0 (24)
is an increasing function of ρ0 since β00β11/β10β01 < 1. Considering that
ρ20 ∈ (−1, 0) is defined as limρ1→0 bˆ|ρ0=ρ20 = 0, we derive from (20):
bˆ|ρ1=ρ0=ρ20 = 1−
(
β11
δ+g
) ρ20
(1+ρ20)βˆ01 > 0 (25)
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Therefore bˆ|ρ1=ρ0 > 0 for any ρ0 ≥ ρ20.
Considering Lemma 5 under (22), we then conclude the following results:
c) for any given ρ0 ∈ (ρ20, ρ30), there exists ρ21 > max{0, ρ0} such that
bˆ > 0 for all ρ1 ∈ [0, ρ21);
d) for any given ρ0 > ρ30, bˆ > 0 for all ρ1 ≥ 0.
Therefore, under (22), we conclude from points a)-e) that local indetermin-
acy occurs in the following cases:
i) for any given ρ0 ∈ (ρ20,max{ρ10, ρ30}) and ρ1 ∈ (ρ1, ρ¯1) with ρ1 ∈ (ρˆ1, 0)
and ρ¯1 = ρ21 > max{0, ρ0};
ii) for any given ρ0 > max{ρ10, ρ30} and ρ1 > ρ1 with ρ1 = ρ11 > 0.
5.10 Proof of Proposition 6
We use the same kind of arguments as in Proposition 5. Consider first the
capital intensity difference at the private level b. Under Assumption 2 and
β10β01/β11β00 > 1, we have already shown in the proof of Proposition 5 that
there exists ρ10 > 0 such that:
a) for any given ρ0 ∈ (−1, ρ10), b < 0 for all ρ1 ≥ 0;
b) for any given ρ0 > ρ10, there exists ρ
1
1 ∈ (0, ρ0) such that b < 0 for all
ρ1 > ρ
1
1.
Consider now the quasi capital intensity difference at the social level
bˆ. Under Assumption 2 and βˆ10βˆ01/βˆ11βˆ00 > 1, we derive from (20) that
limρ1→0 bˆ|ρ0=0 < 0 while limρ1→0 bˆ|ρ0→+∞ > 0. Therefore, there exists
ρ20 > 0 such that limρ1→0 bˆ > 0 for any ρ0 > ρ20. Since bˆ > b, we
get ρ20 < ρ
1
0. Similarly, we derive from (21) that limρ1→+∞ bˆ|ρ0=0 < 0
while limρ1→+∞ bˆ|ρ0→+∞ > 0. Therefore, there exists ρ30 > 0 such that
limρ1→+∞ bˆ > 0 for any ρ0 > ρ30.
Now notice from (20) and (21) the following property:
lim
ρ1→+∞
bˆ|ρ0=ρ20 = 1−
(
β11
δ+g
−βˆ11
βˆ01
) 1
1+ρ20
(
β11
δ+g
) ρ20
(1+ρ20)βˆ01 < 0
Therefore we get ρ20 < ρ
3
0.
Consider finally equations (24) and (26). Since ρ20 > 0 is such that
limρ1→0 bˆ|ρ0=ρ20 = 0, we derive from (20): bˆ|ρ1=ρ0=ρ20 < 0. On the con-
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trary, since ρ30 > 0 is such that limρ1→+∞ bˆ|ρ0=ρ30 = 0, we derive from (21):
bˆ|ρ1=ρ0=ρ30 = 1−
(
βˆ01
β11
δ+g
−βˆ11
) 1
1+ρ30 > 0 (26)
Therefore we get bˆ|ρ1=ρ0 > 0 for any ρ0 ≥ ρ30.
Considering Lemma 5, we then conclude the following results:
c) for any given ρ0 ∈ (ρ20, ρ30), there exists ρ21 ∈ (0, ρ0] such that bˆ > 0 for
all ρ1 ∈ [0, ρ21);
d) for any given ρ0 > ρ30, bˆ > 0 for all ρ1 ≥ 0.
Notice that since bˆ > b, we get ρ21 > ρ
1
1.
Therefore, we conclude from points a)-d) that local indeterminacy occurs
in the following cases:
i) for any given ρ0 ∈ (ρ20,max{ρ10, ρ30}) and ρ1 ∈ (ρ1, ρ¯1) with ρ1 ∈ (ρˆ1, ρ0)
and ρ¯1 = ρ21 ∈ (0, ρ0];
ii) for any given ρ0 > max{ρ10, ρ30} and ρ1 > ρ1 with ρ1 = ρ11 ∈ (0, ρ0).
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